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Introduction 
 
“Here, I think we are touching on…one of the most harmful habits in 
contemporary thought…: the analysis of the present as being precisely, in 
history, a present of rupture…The solemnity with which everyone who 
engages in philosophical discourse reflects on his own time strikes me as a 
flaw…I think we should have the modesty to say to ourselves that…the time we 
live in is not the unique or fundamental or irruptive point in history…We must 
also have the modesty to say, on the other hand, that the time we live in is very 
interesting: it needs to be analysed and broken down, and that we could do 
well to ask ourselves “What is the nature of our present”.1 
 
Ireland’s criminal justice system is showing some signs of drift in the 
direction of an ‘assembly line’ model of justice in which the State-
individual balance is increasingly tipped in favour of the former. This is 
been achieved by dismantling some of the previous ‘ceremonious rituals’ 
which cluttered up the process of justice and succeeded in blinding 
Damocles. This ‘tooling up’ of the Irish state is evident, for example, in 
the law of search and seizure;  in the expansion of the pre-trial detention 
powers of the Gardaí (Irish police);  in restrictions on the right to silence 
and the right to privacy;  in the expansion in the range of hybrid offences 
which, at the option of the prosecutor, deny the right of an accused to a 
jury trial; in curtailments in the right to bail; and, in increased attempts 
being made to reduce the art of sentencing in Ireland to a Procrustean 
formula which mechanically fits punishment to crime. The whole centre 
of gravity of the criminal process, as Walsh has suggested, ‘is moving 
rapidly away from the open public forum of the court and into the private 
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closed demesne of the police station’.2 The same author noted: 
‘[i]ncreasingly guilt will be determined by executive processes in the 
closed secrecy of the police station rather than by judicial processes in the 
public transparency of the courtroom. Judicial territory is being ceded to 
the police to achieve a further streamlining and bureaucratisation of the 
criminal process’.3 The employment of criminal law as the monopoly 
mechanism for dealing with deviant behaviour is also beginning to 
fragment and blur. In particular, the diversification and diffusion of the 
State into the civil sphere as a means of crime control—through, for 
example, the taxation and confiscation of the proceeds of crime even in 
the absence of a criminal conviction—is becoming more visible in 
Ireland.
4
  
 
The direction and thrust of all of these various traits appear consistent 
with Packer’s crime control model of justice which adopts an 
instrumental logic that favours the primacy of the public over the 
individual, promotes the need for efficiency as regards criminal justice 
operations and outputs,
5
   emphasises at every turn the exercise of 
authoritarian state power, and has as its validating authority a hyperactive 
legislature ‘more concerned to subject penal decision making to the 
discipline of party politics and short-term political calculation’.6 
Moreover, this erosion of institutional restraints and balances appears to 
be carved out on the back of political expediency, as a means of 
‘governing through crime’.7 
 
The crime control analyses identified above is thus very useful in 
describing the thrust and direction of these various trends, particularly 
given the tendency in such literature to review events through the lens 
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of stark juxtaposition: from sovereign to disciplinary power;
8
 due 
process to crime control;
9
 modernity to late modernity/postmodernity 
(Lea 2002);
10
 penal welfarism to a culture of control;
11
 a constitutional 
state to a  security state;
12
 individualised justice to actuarial justice;
13
 
an inclusive to an exclusive society;
14
  civilising to decivilising trends;
15
 
correctionalist criminology to criminologies of everyday life;
16
 
liberalism to communitarianism/neo-liberalism/neo-conservatism;
17
 and 
Rule of Law to Rule by Law modes of governance.
18
 Such juxtapositions 
are designed to facilitate analogies, contrasts and generalisations. This 
serves the very useful purpose of highlighting ruptures, discontinuities, 
and dissimilarities with orthodox practices and ways of thinking. It can 
pinpoint various contemporary threads in contemporary justice—
relations with the accused, victims, the State, policing, politicians, the 
media, and society—and demonstrate the ways in which they are being 
unravelled from familiar patterns. All of this forces us to look at the 
bigger picture―at the ‘structural properties of the field’―in Ireland and 
consider the consequences and implications of the changes occurring. 
  
There is a danger, however, in pursuing an agenda of juxtaposition too 
far. In only seeking to gather evidence of dramatic dissimilarities and 
discontinuities, crime control analyses often overlooks strong patterns 
of similarity, stability and continuity. Though it is tempting and indeed 
exciting to be swept up in the grand narrative of such analyses, 
particularly their nihilistic overtures, they may not accurately depict the 
complexities of the criminal process.
19
  This is particularly true in 
relation to the field of law which continues to play a vital role in the 
resolution of crime disputes. The discipline itself is often downplayed in 
crime control literature, particularly its  ‘internal point of view’, its 
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‘institutions’20 and structure of justification, its hierarchical and 
coordinated features, the limiting tendencies associated with rule 
determinism, and its capacity – through the judiciary - to be  ‘last 
authoritative voice’ on all attempts at dispute resolution or settlement .21  
 
The point the article particularly wishes to make is that the liberal 
ideology of legalism and constitutionalism has delivered, and continues 
to deliver, significant protections to those accused of crime that set 
some limits to the power of the Irish State and the ‘tyranny of the 
majority’. Though discounted in crime control literature, it has a power 
and a reach that remains significant and real. Its embedded nature offers 
more than token resistance to newly emerging, more control orientated, 
orthodoxies. To dismiss it, or to afford it epiphenomenal status only (as 
‘law in books’ or ‘paper rules’), is to neglect its capacity to check power 
and to offer sustained and dogged opposition to the creation of a 
‘culture of control’ society. Its continued presence ensures that there is 
unlikely to be any sudden irruptive point in the trajectory of the Irish 
criminal justice system that moves us decisively in the direction of 
absolutist control. Any broad reconfiguration is much likely to be of the 
staccato kind, involving relatively rapid reversals in some areas, whilst 
encountering sustained resistance on others that will require much in the 
way of confrontation and negotiation. This makes for a much more 
messy picture of ‘the present’, a contested site where old and the new 
phenomena cannot easily be compartmentalised into master patterns, 
and where the rhetoric of labels and reality of practices do not always 
coincide.  
 
The article will commence with a very broad historical account of the 
emergence of a rights based conception of the Rule of Law in Ireland, 
before going on to examine, through an analysis of  four cases on 
terrorism and sexual offending, how it continues to compete for priority 
in the Irish courts. The cases are designed to act as an analytic device, 
rather than a thickly descriptive, phenomenological account. They are 
included so as to provide sufficient evidence to avoid vacuity, but are 
also linked to a broader level of abstraction which will help to avoid 
parochialism or black-letterism.  
 
Liberal Legalism in the Criminal Process  
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A Rule of Law framework has developed in Ireland which restrains the 
arbitrary or coercive exercise of executive authority, where a strong 
state must have respect for and indeed, in some instances, yield to a 
weak enemy.
22
 Gradually in the course of the nineteenth century, the 
criminal complex was redrawn as a new statist administrative 
machinery emerged for investigating, prosecuting and punishing crime. 
Subjects increasingly ceded ‘their authorisations to use coercion to a 
legal authority that monopolises the means of legitimate coercion and if 
necessary employs these means on their behalf’.23 The penal field 
increasingly dissociated itself from the local, personal and arbitrary 
confrontations that governed criminal relations in the eighteenth century 
and became a more depersonalised, rule-governed affair with the State 
at the centre. Private disputes and vendettas were thus gradually 
monopolised by the State apparatus and rerouted into the courtroom. A 
society in which ‘the law operates more and more as the norm’24 slowly 
emerged  reflecting the ‘public interest’ and the ‘will of the people’ 
in which the temptation to commit crime would no longer be countered 
by a sovereign will to command and a display of terror.
25
 When this 
process was completed, ‘sovereign power was transformed into a public 
power’.26  
 
Though each citizen gave over some freedom to the sovereign in the 
interests of self-preservation, and the protection of liberty rights and 
human entitlements, the quid pro quo nature of the arrangement 
ensured, through a rhetoric and logic of liberal legalism, that the 
sovereign guaranteed to respect the liberty, equality and freedom of 
each citizen. The sum of power ceded could not be employed arbitrarily 
to usurp freedom or liberty.  Gradually the old hierarchical order of 
patronage was increasingly undermined by a classical liberalist and 
utilitarian belief in the free individual who possessed ‘negative’ rights 
which could be construed as freedoms from government. The ascriptive 
status of individuals under the old hierarchical model of authority, 
where individuality was to some extent subsumed into a person’s 
attachment to a particular location, grouping, and placement within that 
grouping, was overtaken by a new horizontal vision which emphasised 
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rationalism, liberalism, egalitarianism and freedom.
27
 The primacy of 
the individual and his or her self-determining and self-realising 
capabilities began to take centre-stage. In contrast to the fixed identities 
fashioned by pre-modern status relationships, modern ‘progressive’ 
societies were viewed as oscillating more towards relations that 
recognised the importance of individualism and individual autonomy. 
Lea refers to this process of ‘criminalising abstraction’‘abstracting an 
accused’s criminality from the complex of other characteristics which 
make him what he is’as one of the foundation stones of modern 
criminal law and criminal justice.
28
  
 
This overarching trend had important consequences for the pre-trial, 
trial and sentencing processes. As Wiener suggested, ‘during the first 
half of the nineteenth century criminal justice was pressed to move from 
a series of expressive semipersonal confrontations…to a more 
restrained, rule governed, predictable, depersonalised process’.29 The 
trial, for example, evolved from an ‘expressive theatre’ that sought the 
discovery of truth via an ‘accused speaks’ forum to a more reflective, 
categorised process which sought the determination of justice through 
testing the prosecution case.
30
 A whole corpus of exclusionary common 
law and statutory rules emerged to ensure that the accused was afforded 
the best possible defence against unfair prosecution and punishment. 
Since, and to paraphrase Stephen, the State was so much stronger than 
the individual citizen, and was capable of inflicting so very much more 
harm on the individual than the individual could inflict upon society, it 
could afford ‘to be generous’.31  The local victim justice system thus 
increasingly yielded to a Leviathan criminal justice system that was 
governed by a new set of commitments, priorities and policy choices.  
 
Within such a society, executive arbitrariness and discretionary power 
abuses were constrained, egalitarianism advocated, and procedural justice 
increasingly promoted in addition to substantive justice. In distilling the 
criminal process into a more monopolised State-accused event, an 
‘equality of arms’ framework was created as part of a broader Rule of 
Law value system. This addressed the problem of the previously ‘bad 
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economy of power’ which vested too much…on the side of the 
prosecution… while the accused opposed it virtually unarmed’.32 
Redistributing this economy of power meant an expansion in the 
exclusionary rules of evidence that could be employed by the defence 
against the prosecution case, clearer and greater obligations imposed on 
the State to prove its case against the accused, better opportunities 
afforded to the defence to prepare its case and test the prosecution case, 
and the removal of any obligation of self-exculpation on the accused. 
Even when the case was proved against the accused, he or she was 
subjected to a new power to punish in which ‘an economy of continuity 
and permanence …replace[d] that of expenditure and excess’.33        
 
Following independence in 1922, the political inclination in Ireland was 
to maintain the inherited social, economic and legal structures 
subsisting on the demise of the colonial state. This meant that the 
‘ordinary’ adversarial criminal trial — involving ‘a contest 
morphology’ that included oral presentation of evidence, cross 
examination by counsel, relative ‘judicial passivity’ during the guilt 
determining phase of the trial, and informational sources secured by 
both the prosecution and defence — became deeply ingrained 
throughout the twentieth century as the appropriate means of resolving 
criminal disputes,
34
  despite the best efforts of successive government to 
hive off a zone largely devoid of such standards in order to safeguard 
the security of the state. It also meant that the ideological hegemony of 
liberalism, extolling the ‘classical’ negative need for citizens to be 
protected from the State but also the more positive need of citizens to be 
provided with an opportunity for self-realisation, gradually permeated 
most social, cultural and institutional strata — what Habermas refers to 
as ‘freedom guaranteeing juridification’.35 In the ordinary criminal 
realm, this ensured that standards of normative legitimacy were woven 
into the core of the ordinary pre-trial and trial process.
36
  
 
More importantly, these common law and statutory standards also 
increasingly became fused with constitutional jurisprudence and more 
recently, with human rights jurisprudence. Active judicial review, 
especially since the 1960s, has permitted the development of a great 
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corpus of jurisprudence—constructing a ‘meta-Constitution’—on the 
constitutional role in protecting the rights of the accused and on 
restricting State power.
37
  Logical consistency regarding rules (rule 
formalism or a ‘rulebook’ conception of the Rule of Law) was now 
further buttressed by rights and principles―implemented through a 
constitutional structure―which commands that ‘rules in the rule book 
capture and enforce moral rights’ (a rights-based conception of the Rule 
of Law).
38
 Facilitated by constitutional rights jurisprudence, we have 
thus witnessed a gradual concretisation of the rights of the accused. This 
process is still, to some extent, on-going in Ireland where many due 
process rights have been expanded or given greater protection through 
constitutional recognition.
39
 These include the presumption of 
innocence,
40
 the right to silence in police custody,
41
 the right of access 
to a lawyer,
42
 the voluntariness of confessions,
43
 the exclusion of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence,
44
 and the right to proportionality 
in punishment.
45
 All of this occurred at a time when many western 
jurisdictions were meant to be experiencing more control-orientated 
justice and streamlined pain delivery. Moreover, there has also been an 
increased intervention in Irish State law through the proliferation of 
supranational sources.  The European Convention on Human Rights, for 
example, affording another level of protection for those accused of 
crime, was only incorporated into Irish law in 2003, albeit a weak form 
of entrenchment given that it operates at a sub-constitutional level. The 
European Union also promotes respect for human rights as an essential 
ingredient of good governance. This ensures the coexistence and 
interaction of rights at different levels, ensuring ‘an on-going human 
                                                 
37
 J. Casey, Constitutional Law in Ireland, 3rd edn, (Dublin: Sweet and Maxwell, 2000), 25; D. Gwynn 
Morgan, The Separation of Powers in the Irish Constitution. (Dublin: Round Hall, Sweet and Maxwell, 
1997).  
38
 R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 11-12.  
39
 D. McGrath, ‘The Constitutionalisation of the Law of Evidence’ in E. Carolan and O. Doyle, eds, 
The Irish Constitution: governance and values (Thomson: Round Hall 2008), 293-306. 
40
 O’Leary v The Attorney General [1993] 1 IR 102 at 107. 
41
 Heaney v Ireland [1996] IR 580.  
42
 People (DPP) v Healy [1990] 2 IR 73; for an expansion in the right of access, see People (DPP) v 
Gormley and White [2014] IESC 17. 
43
 Re National Irish Bank [1999] 3 IR 145. 
44
 People (DPP) v Kenny [1990] 2 IR 110;  for a restriction in the right to have unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence excluded, see DPP v JC [2015] IESC 31. See also J. Jackson, ‘Human Rights, 
Constitutional Law, and Exclusionary Safeguards in Ireland in  P. Roberts and J. Hunter, eds., Criminal 
Evidence and Human Rights: reimagining common law procedural traditions (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing), at 119-144.  
45
 People (DPP) v WC [1994] ILRM 321; People (DPP) v M [1994] 3 IR 306. 
rights revolution on the law of criminal evidence and procedure’,46  
making immunisation from their range and effects even more difficult.
47
 
 
The institutionalised nature of these accused rights has ensured that they 
cannot be easily ‘trumped’ for collective policy reasons such as security 
and public protection.
48
  They remain very much part of the topography 
in the criminal process, carrying a ‘threshold weight’,49 ‘which the 
government is required to respect case by case, decision by decision’.50 
They provide a strong mediating influence on the legislature, which is  
supported by an independent judiciary. The remainder of this article will 
examine two relatively recent sexual offence cases, and two terrorist 
cases, to provide evidence of the argument being made here. Though 
based on ‘thick’ legal description, the reasoning and findings in such 
cases will allow me to demonstrate how the Irish criminal process 
continues to embrace liberal properties which cannot be accounted for 
under the unitary logic of crime control analyses. These properties 
include   strong support for ‘rights as trumps’; a core emphasis on 
legality; fidelity to precedent and the hierarchical nature of ontological 
legal sources; the continued appeal of  deontological rather than 
consequentialist reasoning; and the maintenance of a constitutional  
structure which mandates an independent judiciary to have the last word 
on dispute resolution.     
 
(i) Sexual offence cases 
The treatment of those accused or convicted of sex offences is generally 
taken to exemplify crime control in its purest form. The policy choices 
adopted as regards such crimes are generally described as being 
expressive; emotional; orientated towards ‘othering’ and the control of 
aggregates; premised on risk control and greater restrictions that 
demonstrate little respect for the rights of those accused or convicted of 
sex offences; and pessimistic about reintegrative strategies or the 
reformability of such individuals.
51
 But this dystopian trend is not the 
full story, as we shall see through an examination of the following two 
cases. 
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 CC v Ireland and Others – the requirement of mens rea. 
In general, the accused benefits from the presumption that knowledge of 
the wrongfulness of the criminal act (mens rea) is an essential ingredient 
in any determination of guilt. This presumption has been described as a 
‘silken thread in the fabric of the legal system ensuring a just process’.52 
The issue of the requirement of mens rea arose for consideration in the 
case of CC v Ireland and Others.
53
 Section 1(1) of the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act 1935 provided that any person who had carnal 
knowledge of girl under the age of 15 would be guilty of a serious 
offence, punishable by a maximum of life imprisonment.
54
 The accused, 
a 19 year old, was charged with four offences contrary to s 1(1) of the 
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1935. He admitted having consensual 
intercourse with a girl named in the charges but said that she had told him 
that she was 16 years of age when in fact she was only 14. The offence 
under section 1(1) of the 1935 Act, however, afforded no defence once 
the actus reus (the actual act) was established.  
 
This derogation from the requirement of mens rea was traditionally 
justified in law under the utilitarian rationale that the legislation was 
designed to ‘protect young girls, not alone against lustful men, but 
against themselves’.55 Though such a provision had the potential to cause 
injustice in individual cases, it served the greater good because its ‘in 
terrorem’ effect would prevent men from having sexual intercourse with 
young girls in circumstances where they did not know for certain that 
they were above the relevant age. Citing Canadian authorities, counsel 
for the accused in the case argued that the foundation of our criminal 
justice system did not rest on utilitarianism but on the precept that a ‘man 
cannot be adjudged guilty and subjected to punishment unless the 
commission of the crime was voluntarily directed by a willing mind’.56 
The Supreme Court agreed—demonstrating the importance of integrity 
over narrow rule based consistency—stating that the provision expressly 
criminalized the mentally blameless. This was intolerable under any 
‘civilized system of justice’. Hardiman J noted: 
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It appears to us that to criminalize in a serious way a person who is 
mentally innocent is indeed to inflict a grave injury on that person’s 
dignity and sense of worth’ and to treat him as ‘little more than a 
means to an end…It appears to us that this, in turn, constitutes a 
failure by the State in its laws to respect, defend and indicate the 
rights of liberty and to good name of the person so treated, contrary 
to the State’s obligations under Article 40 of the Constitution.57    
 
Accordingly, section 1(1) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1935 
was declared to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution. 
Following the decision, the legislature was forced to rush through the 
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2006 which continues to make it an 
offence to engage in a sexual act with a child but now provides a defence 
for the accused if he can prove that he honestly believed that the child 
was over the relevant age.   
 
S.H. v The Director of Public Prosecutions – the presumption of 
innocence and delay in sexual offence cases 
One of the primary building blocks designed to recognise the ‘principled 
asymmetry’ of Government-citizen interactions in the criminal arena is 
the presumption of innocence. It demands that the State bear the burden 
of adducing sufficient evidence of all the elements of the offence charged 
against the accused, and that the guilt of the accused must be established 
beyond reasonable doubt. In practice this means that the accused does not 
have to account for his conduct or actions. He or she does not bear the 
onus of proving the circumstances which may reduce the charge against 
him or her, or lead to an acquittal.  All that is required is that the trier of 
fact is left with a reasonable doubt on some essential matter after the 
prosecution has been ‘put to proof’. 
  
The normative legitimacy of this principle is rooted in the notion that a 
wrongful conviction is a deep injustice and a fundamental moral harm. 
The procedural protection afforded by the presumption is designed to 
recognise that conviction constitutes public censure and, invariably, leads 
to a punishment. Innocent individuals need to be protected from this 
otherwise legitimate violence. It is also a recognition of the huge disparity 
in resources between the State and the defendant and of the fragility of 
fact-finding at criminal trials. Thus in steering between the Scylla of 
acquitting the guilty and the Charybdis of convicting the innocent, the 
logic underpinning the presumption falls squarely within the latter camp. 
By allocating the ‘risk of misdecision’ to the State, the presumption acts 
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as a foundational principle which affords the innocent (and sometimes the 
guilty) accused every possible chance to be acquitted. It is an 
acknowledgement, in a democratic society which embraces the 
transcending value of the freedom and good name of every individual, 
that the social disutility of convicting an innocent citizen far exceeds the 
disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty.   
 
The presumption was however severely tested by the emergence of a 
series of historic sexual abuse cases in the mid 1990s. In Ireland, an 
accused person facing criminal charges relating to a delayed complaint 
can seek to have the complaint struck out on the grounds that it prejudices 
his or her  right to a fair trial. Where, however, the delay was attributable 
to the actions or conduct of the accused in delayed sexual abuse cases, the 
Irish courts had held in a series of judgments since the mid 1990s that 
those accused of such crimes would not be permitted to rely on the expiry 
of a lengthy period of time to frustrate the prosecution of the case. The 
jurisprudence which developed indicated that where a court was asked to 
prohibit the trial on grounds of excessive delay it could take into account 
the extent to which the accused had contributed to delay in the reporting 
of the offence to the prosecution authorities. The factors to be taken into 
account included whether there was a close personal relationship between 
the accused and the complainant which might prevent the making of a 
complaint, and whether there was evidence of the complainant having a 
position of dominance such as might delay the making of the complaint.
58
  
In  P.O’C. v Director of Public Prosecutions,59 for example,  Keane CJ 
stated in the Supreme Court:  
 
Where … there has been significant delay on the part of the victim 
of the alleged crime in reporting it to the authorities, a question may 
arise as to whether the delay is explicable by reference to the nature 
of the crime itself. This question arises in cases of sexual offences 
allegedly committed by adults against children and particularly in 
cases where the adult is in a position of authority in relation to the 
child, e.g. as parent, step-parent, teacher or religious. In cases 
coming within the last named category, the inquiry conducted by the 
court which is asked to halt the trial necessarily involves an 
assumption by the court that the allegation of the victim is true. 
Without such an assumption, it would not be possible for the court to 
conduct any such inquiry and the court would be obliged 
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automatically to halt the trial of a person because of the expiry of a 
lengthy period of time, even though the failure to make a complaint 
was due to domination exercised by the adult over the young child 
during the period of the abuse and even where—as has happened in 
a number of cases—the abuse has been perpetrated over many years 
by a parent or step-parent of a child actually living in the family 
home with the perpetrator. Since that patently cannot be the law, the 
presumption of innocence which applies in its full rigour to a 
criminal trial cannot apply to inquiries of this nature.  
 
The problem with this reasoning is that in assuming that the trial can 
proceed because the delay was attributable to the accused’s own actions, 
one is in effect in suspending or permitting a temporary reversal of the 
presumption of innocence.
60
 A number of judgments believed that such a 
suspension was justified because it struck a proper chord between 
ensuring that the perpetrators of such crimes did not easily escape trial 
but also upholding the rights of an accused to a fair trial (the presumption 
would reapply for the trial of the offences the judicial review determined 
that the case should proceed). Nevertheless, this reasoning remained 
problematic, not least because it did not present the constitutional right to 
a presumption of innocence in its best possible light. The Irish Supreme 
Court in S.H, drawn upwards in a ‘justificatory ascent’ in order to resolve 
the conflict,
61
 has now determined that the only relevant question in such 
cases is whether there is a real or serious risk that the accused by reason 
of the delay would not obtain a fair trial. The accused benefits fully from 
the presumption of innocence at all stages of the process, including the 
judicial review process. Murray CJ noted: 
 
The test is whether there is a real or serious risk that the applicant, 
by reason of the delay, would not obtain a fair trial, or that a trial 
would be unfair as a consequence of the delay. The test is to be 
applied in light of the circumstances of the case…As a consequence 
any question of an assumption, which arose solely for the purpose of 
applications of this nature, of the truth of the complainants’ 
complaints against an applicant no longer arises. The inquiry which 
should be made is whether the degree of prejudice is such as to give 
rise to a real or serious risk of an unfair trial. The factors of 
prejudice, if any, will depend upon the circumstances of the case.
62
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This places the presumption of innocence on a safer footing—again 
emphasising the importance of integrity over rule book formalism—and 
indicates that the values underpinning the presumption, at least at a 
judicial level if not more broadly, continue to resonate and compete for 
priority in the Irish criminal process. 
 
(ii) Cases involving Terrorism 
The use of emergency laws in Ireland has a long history. They have 
become a habitual part of the legal armoury of the State, creating a dual 
system of justice. The administration of justice has been affected by the 
continuous adoption of emergency legislation that circumvents normal 
due process rights due to the exigencies of the domestic situation. The 
deviations  − suspension of habeas corpus, trial before a non-jury court 
overseen by military personnel, proscription of organisations, mass 
internment, direct political control of police operations, increased 
powers of detention without charge, restrictions on silence, and the use 
of ‘belief’ evidence – create special zones where normal laws do not 
apply. They are justified on the basis of the threats posed, and the 
paralysis of liberal constitutionalism in the light of such threats. The 
functional necessity of security and public protection in a time of 
emergency demands this.
63
 But as we shall see in the following two 
cases, these instrumental special zones are not entirely beyond the reach 
of normative conceptions of the Rule of Law. 
 
Damache v The DPP – self substantiating  search warrants.  
 
Most statutory powers of entry, search and seizure are still exercisable 
only on foot of a warrant in Ireland. Where the property to be searched 
is or includes a dwelling, a warrant is a standard prerequisite given the 
constitutional protection of the dwelling.
64
 Most warrants also require 
the authorisation of an independent person, such as a District judge or 
peace commissioner, before they may lawfully be issued, and such 
issuing authority must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that relevant evidence is to be found in the specified place. 
There has, however, been some legislative inroads into this principle of 
independent authorisation in recent years. A number of statutes now 
permit search warrants to be issued internally in ‘circumstances of 
urgency’.65  
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 Standing outside these exceptions is the Offences Against the State Act 
1939, which forms a principal pillar in Ireland’s quest to combat the 
menace of paramilitarism. Section 29(1) of the Act provides that ‘where 
a member of the Garda Síochána not below the rank of superintendent is 
satisfied that there is reasonable ground for believing that evidence of or 
relating to the commission or intended commission of a [relevant] 
offence is to be found in any place whatsoever, he or she may issue to a 
member of the Garda Síochána not below the rank of sergeant a search 
warrant under this section in relation to such place’. Search warrants 
provided for under section 29 can only be issued in respect of specified 
offences relating mostly, though not exclusively, to terrorist activity. 
Despite the lack of independent oversight, the provision was seen as 
having a ‘proven utility in relation to arms finds and related matters’.66    
 
The provision was subject to constitutional scrutiny in 2012. Ali Charaf 
Damache was investigated by An Garda Síochána in relation to a 
conspiracy to murder Mr. Lars Vilks, a Swedish cartoonist, who had 
depicted the Islamic prophet Mohammad with the body of a dog, 
thereby provoking serious unrest in several Muslim countries.  A Garda 
superintendent involved in the investigation authorised a search of 
Damache’s home pursuant to s. 29(1) of the Act of 1939. Arising from 
evidence gathered during this search, Damache was charged with 
making threatening telephone calls. He brought an application by way 
of judicial review seeking a declaration that s. 29(1) of the Act of 1939 
was repugnant to the Constitution, on the grounds that the section 
permitted a search his home contrary to the Constitution, on foot of a 
search warrant which was not issued by an independent person. On 
behalf of the state, it was submitted that s. 29(1) of the Act of 1939 is 
not repugnant to the Constitution, but rather is a legitimate part of the 
State's armoury to protect itself from offences against the State and 
against the justice system. The High Court held that the statutory 
provision was valid. Damache then appealed to the Supreme Court. It 
held that the provision was inconsistent with the Constitution on the 
basis that the constitutional inviolability of the home was such that the 
issuance of a warrant to search a dwelling should adhere to fundamental 
principles encapsulating an independent decision maker, who was able 
to assess the conflicting interests of the State and the individual in an 
impartial manner.
67
  
 
Denham C.J noted:  
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 The procedure for obtaining a search warrant should adhere to 
fundamental principles encapsulating an independent decision 
maker, in a process which may be reviewed. The process should 
achieve the proportionate balance between the requirements of 
the common good and the protection of an individual's rights.
68
  
 
The Supreme Court protected the right to inviolability of the dwelling, 
and reasserted the importance of the principle nemo iudex in causa sua,  
by focusing on the lack of independent oversight in the statutory regime 
provided for under section 29 of the Offences Against the State Act 
1939. It did so, despite the evidence in the individual case, despite the 
ramifications for all cases that had not reached finality in respect of 
evidence gather under the section 29 provision, and despite the 
ramifications for all prosecutions that planned to rely on evidence 
gather under the section 29 provision as it then existed.
69
  
 
People (DPP) v Colm Murphy – the Omagh bombing, police interview 
notes and previous convictions.  
 
On the 15th August, 1998, a car bomb exploded at Market Street, Omagh, 
County Tyrone, Northern Ireland, which resulted in one of the worst 
atrocities of ‘the ‘troubles’, with 29 fatalities and over 300 injured. It 
occurred at a time when the town was crowded with shoppers and 
visitors. Telephone warnings had been given shortly before the explosion, 
but the location of the car bomb was wrongly stated in the warnings, in 
consequence of which people were moved from the area where the bomb 
was stated to be to the other end of the town where in fact, unknown to 
the police, the bomb was situated and duly exploded.  
 
Colm Murphy, a ‘known dissident republican terrorist’, was charged with 
conspiracy to cause the Omagh bombing contrary to section 3 of the 
Explosive Substances Act 1883. Following his arrest on 21st February, 
1999, the accused was detained at Monaghan Garda Station for three 
successive periods of 24 hours. He made admissions in the course of 
being interviewed.  During questioning, however, two Garda (police) 
officers tampered with written interview notes and were found to have 
lied under oath.  The non-jury trial court, the Special Criminal Court,  
dealt with this issue at the close of the prosecution case by declining a 
request for a direction but by altogether excising the evidence and 
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interview notes compiled by the two Gardaí from the body of evidence to 
which the court would have regard. It did not find however that the 
behaviour of the two Gardaí tainted the conduct of other officers who 
formed part of the interrogation team or that there was any basis for 
finding that a more widespread involvement of the investigation team in 
these improprieties had taken place. The accused was found guilty and 
sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment. In delivering judgment, the Special 
Criminal Court went on to note as follows:  
 
The court is satisfied that the following facts which have been 
proved in evidence beyond a reasonable doubt are collectively 
corroborative of the accused's confessions of guilt regarding his 
part in the conspiracy to plant and detonate the Omagh car bomb… 
 
7. The accused is a republican terrorist of long standing having 
been convicted of serious offences of that nature in this State and 
in the United States of America for each of which he served prison 
sentences.  
 
In the light of that background and his membership of a dissident 
terrorist group in Ireland which is not on ceasefire, he is person 
(sic) likely to be involved in terrorist activities of the sort charged 
against him.
70
 
 
 
On appeal, Murphy argued, inter alia, that the Special Criminal Court 
failed to either grant a direction or acquit the accused when there was 
before the court evidence that police witnesses had altered notes of 
written interviews and had lied under oath, and that it breached his 
entitlement to a presumption of innocence by having regard to 
inadmissible evidence of previous convictions. The Court of Criminal 
Appeal overturned his conviction on both of these points. In respect of 
the issue of the alteration of notes, it held:  
 
We do not consider that the court of trial brought to the issue of 
the possible contamination of evidence or to the evaluation of the 
surviving garda evidence that degree of extra critical analysis 
which was surely warranted... The court feels compelled for this 
reason to set aside the conviction as unsafe.
71
 
 
In relation to the trial court’s reference to previous convictions, it noted:  
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To have regard to previous convictions in respect of which no 
admissible evidence was tendered and where no grounds for 
doing so were established can only be seen as a significant 
erosion of the presumption of innocence…While this was not a 
jury trial where the risk of prejudice would be glaringly obvious, 
it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the previous 
convictions and bad character of the accused (as so found by the 
court) formed a significant element in the courts decision to 
convict… This court is therefore of the view that the conviction 
of the accused is unsafe and unsatisfactory for this reason also.
72
 
 
The court therefore set aside the conviction of the accused on both of 
those grounds. 
 
A reading of these cases reveals much more than the operation of 
blanket instrumentalism. The reasoning put forward demonstrates a way 
of knowing that cannot be understood in terms of a  post constitutional 
security state working entirely beyond the constraints of the Rule of 
Law, or of the decline of judicial governance more generally.
73
   Instead 
the findings  demonstrate the continued appeal of deontological 
considerations and principles,  operating to uphold rights, despite the 
very unpleasant consequences. They reveal evidence of judges ‘directed 
by principles embedded in the law as a whole, principles that adjudicate 
which consequences are relevant and how these should be weighted, 
rather than by their own political or personal preferences’.74 If anything, 
when viewed in their entirety, these cases reveal a contradictory mix, 
where Rule of Law and Rule by Law elements sit alongside each other 
in a fluid arrangement, rather than presenting as mutually exclusive 
options. The extra-juridical/political v the juridical/constitutional 
operate as  parallel systems – though involved in a constant dialective – 
rather than fitting in to neat schisms presented under culture of control 
analyses.  Instead of seeking to align such practices with security and 
control master patterns only, it is  better, as Agamben notes, to view it 
‘as a double structure, formed by two heterogeneous yet coordinated 
elements: one that is normative and juridical in the strict sense…and 
one that is …metajuridical’.75 
 
 
What insights can cases of this kind offer? 
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The findings in CC (the right not to be criminalised for mentally 
blameless conduct), SH (the right to have the presumption of innocence 
apply at all stages of the criminal process), Damache (the need for 
independent oversight in protecting the right to inviolability of the 
dwelling), and Murphy (the possible contamination of evidence and the 
need to exclude evidence of previous convictions of  the accused as 
probative of his guilt) demonstrate the continued resonance and 
‘gravitational force’ of a rights-based conception of the Rule of Law, 
and its capacity to continue to compete for priority and act as a 
counterpoint to the supremacy of the paradigm of control. An explicit 
appeal to crime control alone cannot therefore give meaning to all 
events and decisions in the Irish criminal justice system, particularly 
given that the criminal process is not simply at the disposition of 
political policies. 
  
Of course in recent years it is arguable that Ireland has also witnessed 
the emergence of many crime control tendencies in its approach to 
serious offending. In relation to sexual offences, this includes increases 
in the maximum sentences available for sexual assaults, the introduction 
of a tracking system with notification requirements, civil provisions for 
the making of sex offender orders, mandatory obligations to provide 
employers with information on previous sexual offences in certain 
circumstances, a lack of treatment programmes, and a failure to release 
an individual after the law upon which he was found guilty had been 
declared unconstitutional.
76
 In a sense, a focus on Ireland’s approach to 
serious offences like those involving sex crime reveals a contradictory 
duality at play between the embedded nature of older modernising 
commitments and newer orthodoxies of control, security and public 
protection.          
 
The problem with discourse on the control elements inherent in the 
criminal justice system is that it takes for granted the privileged, 
unifying position of public protection and security over the rights of 
those accused of crime. There is a tendency in such dystopian discourse 
to accept unconditionally the arrival of ‘unvarnished authoritarianism’, 
and the notion that ‘protection from the State’ has been replaced by 
‘protection by the State’.77 In painting this picture of the criminal 
process, control theorists concentrate almost exclusively on legislative 
function (acting upon policy considerations) and ignore the sometimes 
conflicting narrative of entrenched rights based discourse and judicial 
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craft (very often acting in ‘hard cases’, upon ‘principle’ and the 
protection of rights against governmental interference). Both are 
qualitatively and functionally distinct.
78
  Modern liberal political 
systems are often defined by a system of checks and balances on the 
organisation of government,  and entrenched legal rights which are 
safeguarded by an independent, and largely unchecked, judiciary that 
cannot simply be dismissed as a mere instrument of more majoritarian 
institutions such as the executive or legislative assembly  All of this 
constitutes ‘a government of laws, and not of men’, with judges, 
protected from interference, supposedly acting as impartial arbiters. 
Control theorists adopt a narrow instrumental conception of law as 
simply a conduit for the attainment of governmental goals (Rule by 
Law). In doing so, they ignore the extent to which the Rule of Law—
particularly the manner in which the principle of separation of powers 
restricts freedom of manoeuvre—is orientated towards furnishing 
societies with a ‘baseline for self-directed action’.79  
 
In interpreting cases, judges will be guided by the gravitational pull of 
earlier decisions as part of a process for adjudicating and certifying truth 
claims.  In liberal societies, this will often be infused with visions of 
fairness, welfare, and respect for human dignity operating either as 
deontological constraints or simply as principles or justifications 
underpinning various precedents. As Dworkin notes, judges are often 
required―like interpretation within a chain novel―to make their 
decisions, in part, from an interpretation that both fits and justifies the 
institutional constitutional history of their society. This not only relates 
to a narrow rule based understanding of the rights and duties that flow 
from past collective decisions in the relevant disputed area, but also 
incorporates, more broadly, ‘the scheme of principles’ that justify 
them.
80
 They can identify unenumerated rights, expand existing rights to 
incorporate unforeseen issues, revise them in the light ‘of fresh moral 
insight’, and re-examine common law and legislative provisions in the 
light of the Constitution and the European Convention on Human 
Rights striking down anything which is not compatible.
81
 These 
principles continue to comprise of a matrix of values and assumptions 
that are associated with the essence of liberal society.  
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The significance of the distinction between the judiciary and the 
legislature should not be underestimated, particularly in jurisdictions 
that accept that constitutional and human rights jurisprudence are higher 
up the hierarchical pecking order than parliamentary legislation. As 
Packer noted about the distinction:  
 
Because the Crime Control Model is basically an affirmative 
model, emphasising at every turn the existence and exercise of 
official power, its validating authority is ultimately legislative 
(although proximately administrative). Because the Due Process 
Model is basically a negative model, asserting limits on the 
nature of official power and on the modes of its exercise, its 
validating authority is the judicial power and requires an appeal 
to supra-legislative law, to the law of the Constitution.
82
  
 
Control theorists have a tendency to elide the two in presenting this 
perceived drift towards more absolutist control. In doing so, they fail to 
appreciate that arguments of policy, specifying what is perceived to be 
in the public interest, are normally the concern of the legislature, not the 
judiciary. Moreover, they also fail to appreciate that it is the provisions 
of the Constitution and judicial interpretation of same (and the 
European Convention on Human Rights) rather than the concerns of the 
legislature that are the overriding word in any dispute about the rights of 
the accused.
83
 Once enshrined in a constitutional document, a right is 
conferred with an immunity against legislative change, in effect 
‘disabling the legislature from its normal functions of revision, reform, 
and innovation in the law’.84 These rights, and their interpretation by the 
judiciary, qualify and limit collective justifications and strategies 
emanating from ‘the conscience of majoritarian institutions’.85 
 
This may give rise to the ‘counter-majoritarian paradox’―constitutions 
proclaim popular sovereignty but permit a non-elected group of 
individuals, the judiciary, to override what ‘the People’ might 
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want―ensuring that ‘the majority cannot travel as fast or as far as it 
would like’.86 It remains however a secure part of constitutional 
democracies because it ensures that individual citizens are not subject to 
populist and myopic penal politics by legislatures, who mindful of the 
need to secure re-election, are all too ‘susceptible to the influences of 
the short-term’, and  ‘too liable to violent swings and panic measures’.87 
As Tocqueville phrased it, ‘the courts correct the aberrations of 
democracy’,88 better ensuring that all citizens are accorded equal 
concern and respect. This is something often overlooked or downplayed 
in control literature. In Western democracies, it is the courts that have 
been assigned the power to detect constitutional and human rights 
violations, with the authority to override any authority, including 
representative institutions like the legislature, that commit them. 
Moreover, as ultimate decision-makers, they are likely to preserve 
rather than reject this tradition. 
 
Of course, in suggesting this, we should be very wary of pursuing a 
progressive agenda that views the judiciary with rose tinted glasses, as 
the infallible protectors of rights. It is true that judges can, on occasion, 
engage in policymaking and interpret facts, principles, rules and rights 
in ways that support populist sentiments and control orientated goals 
(indeed it can be argued that the finding of the Special Criminal Court 
in Colm Murphy was consequentialist in approach). Irish courts can also 
be overly deferential when it comes to evaluating legislative decisions 
about what the Constitution means. There is also of course the danger of 
over idealising liberal constitutionalism and legalism, and of over 
emphasising the capacity of rights to act as a check on State power. It is 
undoubtedly true that many rights and safeguards are often contingent 
upon interpretation, are inherently limiting, provoke widespread 
disagreement about their weight (and the interests identified as rights), 
and do not always ‘proactively direct the law making process’.89 Liberal 
rights and safeguards also have the capacity, as communitarians argue, 
to ‘atomise’ the legal subject at the expense of any responsibilities that 
he or she might have to the community. Rights-based discourse also 
does little to facilitate popular political participation and is, in general, 
uncomfortable with majoritarian forms of decision-making and 
democratic institutions that are concerned with collective welfare.
90
 It is 
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not my intention to over idealise or eulogise about the safeguards that 
have been created for those accused of crime. The liberal ideology of 
legalism and constitutionalism is not without its problems. Nor is its 
hegemonic position as secure as it once was.  As Loader has noted: 
 
Liberal elistism made sense in, or was at least fitted to, a world 
where crime was less prevalent an act and more settled as a 
cultural category; a world where people evinced trust and 
deference towards social authority and had more patient 
expectations of government; a world marked by greater equality  
and solidarity and less ambient precariousness and insecurity. 
Such an outlook speaks less well to a society where crime has 
become a recurrent feature of everyday life; where the anxieties 
and demands it generates are widely and excitedly disseminated 
by the mass media; where reduced levels of trust in the 
institutions of government coincide with heightened public 
demands of them; where consumerism threatens to eclipse 
citizenship as the organizing political principle―and symbol of 
belonging―of the age.91 
 
Conceding these points, however, does not permit ‘structural’ 
commentators to close themselves off from the continued appeal of 
constitutionalism, legalism, human rights, the internal logic of law, and 
judicial craft, all of which remain strongly imbricated in the cross-
currents of the Irish criminal justice system.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has been concerned with some of the ‘everyday’ of legal life -  
such as fidelity to precedent, ‘rights as trumps’, and the last authoritiative 
voice possessed by the judiciary in the justice system. Though it may 
appear molecular and mundane, this engagement with doctrinal 
reasoning, rights, and the interpretation of legal provisions  is a valid 
‘space of action’92 within the criminal process. Its reality, however, is 
often downplayed in analyses that favour the sharp cut of binary 
distinctions. Though such analyses play an important role in permitting us 
to see the wood from the trees, and elevating lawyers out of black-letter, 
technocratic details, much can be lost in pursuing the logic of 
juxtaposition too far.  
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 What has been lost for the purposes of this paper is the reality   that legal 
and constitutional liberalism continues to  provide institutional and 
epistemic authority in Ireland which cannot easily be dismissed or 
circumvented. Its absence from crime control literature, particularly its 
confinement to discontinued  ‘modern’ ways of doing things, should be of 
concern to anyone exercised by ‘the nature of our present’.  This absence  
demands the employment of more heterogeneous ‘structural’ accounts of 
the criminal process which embrace more fully the contradictions and 
dualities at play,  the contestations, the struggles around what is 
permissible,  the limited room for manoeuvrability, and the internal 
structure of institutional practices.  
 
Such accounts can reveal the complex diversity that lies behind the 
illusory and unifying comfort of ‘fashionable labels’, demonstrating the 
difficulties that binary divisions can have on our thinking. Binaries, 
though very useful as heuristic devices in the criminal process, can carve 
practices along artificial lines which do not replicate the messiness of 
practice. They paint pictures of singular simplicity, of unopposed 
authoritarianism where safeguards, limitations, and liberal values and 
cultures are downplayed.  
 
Rather than persisting with essentialist binaries, it may be better to view 
the criminal justice system as comprising of mutually constitutive parts, 
where several, somewhat contradictory, principal features can co-exist 
together. Such a pluralist approach can more properly account for the 
ways in which the justice system in the early 21st century in Ireland is 
becoming more disaggregated and more contradictory. It is more 
principled but also more repressive, more instrumental but also more 
expressive. It involves more normative legitimacy for rights based 
discourse, as I have sought to show in this article,  but also continues to 
embrace ‘sites of exception’. It is more inclusionary in seeking to 
accommodate victims, witnesses and local communities but also more 
exclusionary through, among other things, the expressive tone adopted 
in respect of offenders and those accused of crime. It is more supra-
national but also more local. It involves more monopolised criminal 
control but also more fragmentation and blurring of boundaries. It 
continues to emphasise adversarialism, but it also increasingly 
encourages fact-finding beyond the courtroom. It is more focused on the 
socially excluded, but is also embraces regulatory strategies that target 
white collar wrongdoing. All of these ‘structural’ phenomena  do not 
neatly align with dystopian or progressive agendas, or comfortably fit 
within the cuts produced by binary labels. They are, nonetheless, real 
elements of ‘our present’. 
